We provide a model in which small and relatively isolated communities can successfully manage local commons informally in circumstances where larger or less isolated communities could not do so. The reason for this is the non-anonymous nature of many interactions between the members of a small and isolated community. Such communities may be able to use these multiple interactions to enforce informal restrictions on the usage of local commons. To the extent that the process of economic development reduces the number of non-anonymous interactions among community members, it will reduce the ability of the community to successfully manage the local commons informally. The resulting need for either explicit regulation or the introduction of private property rights represents a hidden cost of development.
Introduction
It is often claimed that private property rights are essential for the e¢ cient performance of an economy. Secure private property rights allow economies to avoid resource misallocations due to externalities and provide the investment incentives necessary to promote economic growth. 1 Despite these claims, there is evidence that some externalities can be managed without the use of private property rights. In particular, various examples of the successful community management of local common property resources have been documented. 2 This
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1 paper provides a model in which small communities that have limited interaction with the outside world are able to manage local commons in circumstances where communities that are either larger or have more interaction with the outside world could not manage them. One implication of these results is that, rather than being a necessary precursor to development, the need for private property rights might be generated by the process of development.
This paper proceeds as follows. First, we set up a simple static model of a village economy. This model takes the form of a static common property resource game and a set of identical static games that represent the other interactions among villagers. Following this, we analyse an in…nitely repeated version of the simpli…ed village economy. This allows us to examine how the ability of the village to successfully manage the local commons varies with the number of non-anonymous interactions among the villagers. We then describe the nature of economic development for this village economy and discuss the impact of economic development on the ability of the village to manage its local commons without the use of private property rights or some other form of explicit regulation. Finally, we conclude by discussing some potential extensions of the model presented in this paper.
A simple model of a village economy
Imagine a small village in which there are I residents. Suppose that the village has no contact with the outside world, so that it is a closed economy. We are focussing on such a village because we want there to be a relatively large number of non-anonymous transactions between the villagers. The residents of this village want to consume (n + 1) …nal goods and services. This includes n excludible public goods 3 and one private good. The production of the private good requires both labour services and the use of a common property resource. The production of the public goods requires only labour services. The villagers combine to produce the public goods. The public goods in this model capture the non-anonymous transactions that would occur in a small, isolated village. The private good provides a potential incentive for over-exploitation of the common property resource. A formal model of a village economy with these features is described in the appendix to this paper.
In the main body of the paper, we will work with a simpli…ed version of this village economy model. Our focus will be on symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria. As such, we can represent the incentives facing an individual villager in this economy through the use of two payo¤ matrices. One of these payo¤ matrices relates to the interaction of the villagers through their use of the common property resource to produce the private good. The other payo¤ matrix summarises the interaction among villagers in the production of each of the public goods.
If all other villagers choose a common pure strategy, then the payo¤s for villager i in the common property resource interaction may be represented by the payo¤ matrix in Table 1 , where M > W > Z > X > 0: 
There are n other interactions between the villagers in each period. Each of these interactions can be represented by the payo¤ matrix in Table 2 , where 2V > C > V > 0: 
These payo¤ matrices summarise the payo¤s to an individual villager if all of the other villagers employ a common strategy. As such, they are only a subset of all of the potential payo¤s in this village economy game. Since the underlying game is symmetric, however, these two payo¤ matrices provide all of the relevant payo¤s for the calculation of symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria in the underlying game. Nonetheless, it is useful to brie ‡y consider the nature of the underlying game. The underlying game consists of (n + 1) simultaneousmove games. Furthermore, each of these games is conducted simultaneously. One of these games represents the interaction of the villagers through their use of the common property resource. This game is an I-player version of the classic Prisoner's dilemma game. This game very neatly captures the incentive structure underlying a static version of a common-property resource problem. The other n games represent the interaction of the villagers in the production of the public goods. There is one game for each public good and each of these games is identical. Recall that the villagers can exclude individual villagers from consuming the services of a public good in this model. This removes the usual incentive for each villager to shirk on his contribution of labour services to the provision of public goods. We will assume that the cost of providing the public good exceeds the bene…t that any individual villager obtains from its services. As such, the public good interaction can be modelled as a coordination game in which there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria. One of these equilibria involves cooperation among all villagers in the production of the public good and hence the provision of the public good. The other equilibria involves the noncooperation of all villagers in the production of the public good and hence the non-provision of the public good. The cooperative equilibrium Pareto-dominates the noncooperative equilibrium in this public goods game. 
A two person example of the village economy game
The common property resource interaction in each period is represented by the stage game in Table 3 , where Y > W > Z > X > 0 and 2W > X + Y : Table 3 : Two player common property resource interaction
There are n other interactions between the villagers in each period. Each of these interactions can be represented by the stage game in Table 4 , where 2V > C > V > 0: 
There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria in the two-person version of this village economy game. One of these equilibria involves the villagers cooperating in the provision of the public goods and not cooperating in the exploitation of the common property resource. We will call this the cooperative equilibria. The other equilibria involves the villagers not cooperating in any of their interactions. We will call this the non-cooperative equilibria. The cooperative equilibria Pareto dominates the non-cooperative equilibria. As such, we might expect it to be a more likely outcome of this static village economy game. 4 Note that, both of these equilibria are symmetric equilibria. Furthermore, regardless of which equilibrium is chosen in this two-person static village economy, the common-property resource will be over-exploited.
A three person example of the village economy game
The common property resource interaction in each period is represented by the stage game in Table 5 , where M > W > Y > N > Z > X > 0 and 3W > M + 2N : Table 5 : Three player common property resource interaction
There are n other interactions between the villagers in each period. Each of these interactions can be represented by the stage game in Table 6 , where 2V > C > V > 0: Table 6 : Three player other interactions
Just as in the two-person example, there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria in the three-person version of this village economy game. Once again, these are both symmetric equilibria, one of which involves cooperation among the villagers and one of which does not involve cooperation among the villagers. The cooperative equilibria involves the villagers cooperating in the provision of all of the public goods, but not cooperating in the exploitation of the common property resource. The non-cooperative equilibria involves the villagers not cooperating in any of their interactions. The cooperative equilibria Pareto dominates the non-cooperative equilibria, so that we might expect it to be a more likely outcome of this static village economy game. Nonetheless, regardless of which equilibrium is chosen in this three-person static village economy, the common-property resource will be over-exploited.
Outcomes in a village economy
Imagine a community that repeatedly plays the village economy game outlined in the previous section an in…nite number of times. We will assume throughout that all villagers maximise the discounted presented value of their in…nite sequence of per-period expected utilities. These per-period expected utilities are given by the payo¤s from the village economy stage game described in the previous section of this paper. Furthermore, all villagers have a common oneperiod discount factor, 2 (0; 1), that does not vary over time. Furthermore, we will assume that following the completion of the stage game in each period, every villager observes the outcomes of all of the activities in which they interact with the other villagers. We are interested in the impact that multiple interactions, both over time and across activities, have on the ability of a village to sustain cooperation in the use of a common property resource. This requires some benchmarks, against which we can compare the outcomes that occur when both types of multiple interaction are present. As such, we …rst consider what would happen in the absence of multiple interactions between villagers. This includes situations in which there are no multiple interactions in any dimension, as well as the situations in which the multiple interactions only take place either across activities or over time.
The outcome for a short-run association of hermits
Imagine a community whose members only interact through their use of the common property resource. We will call such a community an association of hermits, re ‡ecting the solitary nature of its members. In this section, we consider a situation in which the common property interaction only takes place once. This short-run association of hermits is the most extreme of the benchmark scenarios.
Proposition 1 A short-run association of hermits cannot avoid a tragedy of the commons without the use of private property or some other form of explicit regulation.
Proof. A short-run association of hermits only plays the common property resource interaction component of the stage game. Furthermore, they only play it once. Note that M > W and Z > X. As such, non-cooperation (D i ) is a strictly dominant strategy for each villager in the common property resource game. The unique Nash equilibrium in this game involves all villagers choosing not to cooperate. This means that the common property resource will be overused in the absence of some explicit regulatory regime that alters the payo¤s in the common property resource game.
Outcomes for a short-run village
Now imagine a community whose members interact in many activities. We will call such a community a village, re ‡ecting the somewhat gregarious nature of its members. Suppose that each of these interactions only take place once and occur at a single point in time. This short-run village provides a benchmark in which the members of a community have multiple interactions across activities but not 6 over time. This restriction means that villagers cannot link their behaviour in one activity to the outcome of another activity.
Proposition 2 Short-run villages cannot avoid a tragedy of the commons without the use of private property or some other form of explicit regulation.
Proof. A short-run village only plays the stage game once. Furthermore, the outcome of the common property interaction cannot be observed before the villagers choose their actions in the public goods interactions. As such, deviation in the common property resource interaction cannot be punished in these other interactions. This means that we need only consider the optimal behaviour of each villager in the common property interaction. In e¤ect, we can treat the common property interaction as a separate game. We proved in Proposition 1 that non-cooperation (D i ) is a strictly dominant strategy for each villager in the common property resource game. Thus the unique Nash equilibrium in this game involves all villagers choosing not to cooperate. This means that the common property resource will be overused in the absence of some explicit regulatory regime that alters the payo¤s in the common property resource game.
Outcomes for a long-run association of hermits
The …nal benchmark scenario involves a community of individuals who only interact through their use of a common property resource but do so repeatedly over time. Such a community will be called a long-run association of hermits. We will assume that there are an in…nite number of repetitions of the common property game. The fact that the interactions take place repeatedly over time means that the hermits can link their behaviour in any interaction to the outcome of previous interactions.
Proposition 3 A long-run association of hermits can avoid a tragedy of the commons if every hermit has a discount factor that is no smaller than b 0 = M W M Z 2 (0; 1). Proof. Hermits only interact through their use of the common property resource. As such, a long-run association of hermits involves in…nite repetition of the common-property resource stage game. The e¢ cient outcome in the stage game involves every hermit choosing to cooperate in the use of the common property resource. Suppose that the hermits attempt to sustain this outcome through the use of Nash reversion grim trigger strategies. The maximum net gain to any hermit who deviates from this strategy is:
If a tragedy of the commons is to be avoided, we need this net gain to be non-positive. This requires that:
This ensures that b 0 2 (0; 1).
Outcomes for a long-run village
A long-run village is a community whose members interact with each other both across activities and over time. We have already seen that interaction across activities alone does not allow a community to avoid a tragedy of the commons, but that interaction across time alone might do so. We now look at the impact that interaction across many activities has on the ability to avoid a tragedy of the commons for a community whose members also interact across time. We will assume that the short-run village stage game is repeated an in…nite number of times.
Proposition 4 A long-run village can avoid a tragedy of the commons if every villager has a discount factor that is no smaller than b n = M W M Z+n(V E) 2 (0; 1), where n is the number of interactions between the villagers that do not involve the common property resource.
Proof. Suppose that every villager except for villager i employs the following Nash-reversion grim trigger strategy. They will cooperate in all interactions initially and will continue to do so as long as every other villager has also cooperated in all prior interactions. However, if any villager ever chooses not to cooperate, they will revert to playing the bad Nash equilibrium strategies in the short-run village stage game. This involves non-cooperation in all interactions. If villager i deviates from cooperation in any period, he will do so by overusing the common property resource. He gains nothing by deviating in the other interactions and still incurs the punishment from the rest of the village. As such, the gain to deviating for villager i is:
If villager i deviates, then he will also incur a cost during the punishment phase of the super-game. This cost is given by:
which can be simpli…ed to yield:
Clearly, villager i will deviate if and only if:
This requires that:
In other words, the long-run village can deter deviation by a villager whenever he is su¢ ciently patient ( i b n ). Note that M > W > Z > 0, 2V > C > 0 and I 2. As such, we know that (M Z) > (M W ) > 0 and V C I > 0. This 8 ensures that b n 2 (0; 1) for all n 0. Furthermore, since this game is symmetric and the threatened punishment involves villagers choosing Nash-equilibrium strategies in the stage game, cooperation in all interactions can be sustained as a sub-game perfect equilibrium of the repeated game if all villagers are su¢ ciently patient. Speci…cally, this requires that i b n for all i 2 f1; 2;
; Ig. We have established the circumstances under which a long-run village can avoid a tragedy of the commons. Recall that villagers interact with each other more times in each period than hermits. This di¤erence results in villagers being able to avoid a tragedy of the commons in a larger set of circumstances than hermits.
Proposition 5 A long run village can avoid a tragedy of the commons for a larger range of discount factors than a long-run association of hermits with the same number of members.
Proof. We have
Note that M > W > Z > 0, 2V > C > 0, I 2 and n > 0. This ensures that min (M W ) ; (M Z) ; V C I ; n > 0. Hence we can conclude that
Finally, it is worth noting that the threshold discount factor for the successful management of the local common, b n , falls as the number of contemporaneous interactions between villagers rises.
Proposition 6
As the number of contemporaneous interactions between the …xed number of villagers rises, the threshold discount factor falls. Furthermore, b n ! 0 as n ! 1.
Proof. If we di¤erentiate b n with respect to n, we obtain
Note that M > W > Z > 0, 2V > C > 0 and I 2. As such, we know that (M Z) > 0 and V
Furthermore,
As such, we know that as n rises, b n must be falling towards zero. In other words, the probability that a long-run village with a …xed population can avoid a tragedy of the commons increases as the number of contemporaneous interactions between villagers increases. Note, however, that this result is contingent on the fact that the villagers are already interacting with each other repeatedly over time. The contemporaneous interactions enhance the e¤ective-ness of the temporal interactions. 9 
The impact of economic development
As economic development takes place, this village is likely to develop contacts with the outside world. The opportunity for trade with the outside world is likely to reduce the number of interactions between villagers. Goods and services can now be purchased from outside communities where their production previously required cooperation among the villagers. As such, the process of development can be incorporated in the simple model of a village economy through a reduction in the number of interactions among villagers that do not involve the common property resource. In order to draw direct inferences from the results we derived in the previous section, it is necessary to make some simplifying assumptions. First, we need to assume that the membership of the village does not change as the process of development takes place. Second, we need to assume that villagers hold static expectations about the number of contemporaneous interactions between them in future periods. These assumptions allow us to use the results from the previous section of this paper to draw some inferences about the impact of economic development on the ability of the village to successfully manage the local common.
Initially, when the village is a small and closed economy, the number of interactions between villagers is likely to be rather large. As such, it is highly probable that the village could have deterred individual villagers from over-using the common property resource. In the model, this takes the form of a relatively low threshold discount rate. However, as the village develops and increases its interaction with the outside world, the number of interactions among villagers falls. This leads to an increase in the threshold discount rate.
Proposition 7
As the number of contemporaneous interactions between the …xed number of villagers rises, the threshold discount factor falls. Furthermore, b n ! b 0 as n ! 0.
Proof. In Proposition 5, we established that b n < b 0 . Furthermore, in the process of proving Proposition 6, we established that b n is a strictly decreasing function of n. Finally, note that
Since b n is a strictly decreasing function of n that approaches b 0 as n ! 0, we can conclude that, as n falls, b n must be rising towards b 0 . Eventually, there may come a point where the village can no longer deter individual villagers from over-using the common property resource. At that point, some other solution will be required if a tragedy of the commons is to be avoided. This solution might involve some form of explicit regulation or it might involve the allocation of private property rights.
Proposition 8 If a long-run association of hermits cannot avoid a tragedy of the commons, then there exists some minimum number of contemporaneous interactions between villagers, b n( ) > 0, that must occur if a long-run village whose members have the same common discount factor as the hermits is to avoid a tragedy of the commons.
Proof. If a long-run association of hermits cannot avoid a tragedy of the commons, then the hermits must be too impatient. This means that
Suppose that a long-run village can avoid a tragedy of the commons. Then it must be the case that 2 h b n ; b 0 . This requires that b n , so that
This inequality can be rearranged to obtain
, 2V > C > 0 and I 2, we know that b n( ) > 0. Note that in this simple model of a village economy, rather than private property rights being a precondition for development to take place, it is the process of development that leads to the need for private property rights or some other mechanism to manage local commons. The cost of implementing a more explicit regime for managing the local common is a hidden cost of development. This does not necessarily mean, however, that economic development reduces social welfare. The bene…ts from economic development may well exceed the costs of developing and implementing an explicit regime for managing common property resources.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a simple explanation for the observation that small, isolated communities can sometimes manage common property resources e¤ectively without recourse to private property rights or other forms of explicit regulation. The explanation requires the villagers to interact with each other in a number of activities. It also requires these interactions to be repeated over time. This non-anonymous multi-market contact enhances the ability of the village to deter individual villagers from over-using the common property resource. This insight is similar to the idea that multi-market contact might enhance the ability of …rms to sustain collusion. 5 However, the process of economic development is likely to reduce the need for villagers to directly interact with each other. As the number of activities in which villagers interact declines, it becomes harder for the village to deter over-use of the common property resource. Eventually, an alternative regime for managing the common property resource will be needed. This might involve the allocation of explicit private property rights or other legal restrictions on the use of the common property resource. The cost of implementing such a system is, in a sense, a hidden cost of development.
There are a number of potential extensions to the model developed in this paper. First, the static nature of the villagers' beliefs about the number of interactions could be relaxed. A …rst step in this direction would involve the speci…cation of an exogenous stochastic process that governs the evolution of the number of such interactions. If we also relaxed the assumption of non-durability of the stock of each public good, the evolution of the number of interactions could be endogenised. This would be accomplished by making the probability of a reduction in the number of interactions a function of the existing stock of one or more of the local public goods. Another potential extension to the model would involve replacing the static version of the tragedy of the commons that is employed in this paper with a dynamic version of the tragedy of the commons. Finally, it would be worth exploring the relationship between village size and the number of non-anonymous transactions between the various villagers. In general, the larger a community becomes, the less likely it will be that each villager knows and directly interacts with every other villager. As such, the relationship between community size and the number of non-anonymous interactions is likely to be non-linear. Initially, an increase in the village population might increase the number of non-anonymous transactions. However, eventually a point might be reached at which further increases in village population result in a decrease in the number of non-anonymous transactions among villagers.
Appendix: A formal model of a village economy
Consider a village in which there are I individuals, indexed by i 2 f1; 2; ; Ig. Initially, the village has no interaction with the outside world. As such, it constitutes a closed economy. This assumption will be relaxed later. Each of the villagers uses his own labour (N i ) and some amount of a common property resource (K i ) to produce a private consumption good for his own consumption. Villager i 0 s production of this private consumption good is denoted by c i . In addition to this, the villagers pool their labour to produce some commodities that take the form of excludible public goods. There are J of these public commodities. They are indexed by j 2 f1; 2;
; Jg. Both the private and public goods are perishable and cannot be stored over time. We will assume that all villagers have identical preferences that can be represented by a constant discount rate, , and a per-period Bernoulli utility function, U : R + f0; 1g J ! R. This utility function is de…ned over a villager's consumption of leisure, the private good and each of the J excludible public goods, U (l i ; c i ; q 1 ; q 2 ; ; q J ). For simplicity, assume that each villager's per-period Bernoulli utility function is additively separable. As such, we can write U (l i ; c i ; q 1 ; q 2 ;
; q J ) = u l (l i ) + u c (c i ) + P J j=1 u j (q j ). Each of the private goods is produced using a production technology, F i : R I+1 + ! R + , that can be represented by a production function of the form y i = F (N i ; N i ; K), where K is the total stock of the common property resource in every period. To keep things simple, we will assume that this production technology is the same for every villager, i 2 f1; 2;
; Ig. The amount of the consumption good that is produced by a particular villager in any given period depends in part on the total usage of the resource by the village in that period. Speci…cally, c n = F (N i ; N i ; K) =
where N J+1 = P I i=1 N i;J+1 , f 0 (N J+1 ) > 0 and f 00 (N J+1 ) < 0. Each of the public goods is produced using a production technology, g j : R + ! f0; 1g, which can be represented by a production function of the form q j = g j (N j ). Here q j 2 f0; 1g, where q j = 1 means that the public good is produced and q j = 0 means that it is not produced. Note that the public goods are all or nothing commodities. They are either produced or they are not produced. The labour input to the production of each public good is the aggregate amount of labour devoted to its production by the entire village, so that N j = P I i=1 N i;j . There is some threshold level of labour that is required to produce a particular public good. This threshold level of labour is denoted by b N j . Labour is in scarce supply. Thus the village economy faces a number of feasibility constraints in each period. Each villager has N units of labour to allocate between various activities in each period. As such, the labour feasibility constraints take the form P J+1 j=0 N i;j;t N for all i 2 f1; 2; ; Ig. Here, j = 0 denotes the amount of time that a villager devotes to leisure, while j = J + 1 denotes the amount of time a villager devotes to producing the private consumption good.
